Nord Stream 2 Pipeline
Author: Nicholas Stubblefield Edited by: Nora Lewis and Txai Sibley
Suggested Citation:
Stubblefield, N., Lewis, N., Sibley, T. (2026). Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Technology Assessment Project Case Study Library, University of Michigan. https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/tap-case-study-library/nord-stream-2-…
Nord Stream 2 Pipeline
Key Takeaways
- Energy infrastructure can provide exploitative geopolitical power to exporting countries.
- The successful implementation of energy technology is contingent on the cooperation of many geopolitical actors.
- Elite capture can be used to further leverage geopolitical influence by unequally promoting technological deployment.
- The geopolitical power offered by energy infrastructure projects can offset purported carbon-reduction goals, serving to entrench old energy relationships.
- Energy infrastructure is vulnerable to terrorism and state-funded attacks, with potentially devastating ecological and carbon impacts.
The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a pair of pipes built to ferry natural gas from Russia to Germany. Spanning around 1200km, its course through the Baltic Sea provides the pipeline with a direct connection between natural gas producer (Russia) and consumer (Germany and other European states), eliminating the need to transit that gas through third party countries. The pipeline is owned by Russian state-controlled energy company Gazprom through its subsidiary Nord Stream, and a coalition of European energy companies including Engie, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall financed the project (Adomaitis & Ahlander, 2024; Offshore Technology, 2024). Its construction began in 2018 and concluded in 2021, but it may never become operational (Adomaitis & Ahlander, 2024) because Germany refused to bring the pipeline online after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The pipeline now serves as a symbol of the influence Russia wields through its massive energy projects.
Nord Stream 2: A Geopolitical Energy Weapon
Natural gas plays a vital and growing role in Europe's energy economy. As many countries opt to close their nuclear and coal plants, the EU has increased its reliance on natural gas, and Russia has served as its primary provider (Martin, 2021). Nord Stream 2 expands an already present Russian dominance in the European natural gas market. In 2019, Russia supplied 43% of the European Union's gas imports (Martin, 2021). Alone, Nord Stream 2 would annually transport 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, enough fuel to power 26 million households. In combination with Nord Stream 1, the two Baltic pipelines could import 1/3 of Europe's forecasted natural gas needs for the next two decades (Offshore Technology, 2024.). The EU's dependence on Russian gas, and Nord Stream 2's further enablement of that relationship, stirred intense controversy and stoked concerns over European energy security.
In Europe, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia actively opposed Nord Stream 2's construction and appealed to the EU to stop the pipeline project. These 11 countries sent a letter to the European Commission declaring the pipeline a violation of EU interests (Sytas, 2016). Additionally, Poland, which borders the Baltic Sea, fined Gazprom for not acquiring Polish government consent to construct Nord Stream 2. Gazprom has appealed Poland's $7.5 billion fine (Offshore Technology, 2024).
The United States also attempted to stop the project. Fearing greater Russian influence in Europe, the US sanctioned Allseas, the Dutch pipe-laying company constructing the pipeline (Bureau of Energy Resources, 2021). These sanctions successfully stalled pipeline construction for nearly two years and in turn garnered rebuke from European leaders (Offshore Technology, 2024). Construction resumed when Russia employed its own pipe-laying company to finish the job (Offshore Technology, 2024).
Russia's chosen placement for Nord Stream 2 had unambiguous strategic disadvantages for Ukraine. Russia owns several pipelines supplying Europe with natural gas. Historically, most of that gas has run through Ukraine providing the country substantial revenue through transit fees. In 2009, 80% of Europe's destined natural gas ran through Ukraine (Reuters, 2009). However, with the construction of additional pipelines (like Nord Stream 1 and Turk Stream) through the Baltic and Black seas, that share has fallen (Reuters, 2009). A completed Nord Stream 2 would allow for all of Russia's gas exports to circumvent Ukraine entirely (Martin, 2021). Indeed, this seems to have been Russia's intention. In 2021, shortly after Nord Stream 2 had finished construction, Putin threatened to cut gas transit through Ukraine if the latter did not sufficiently display "good will" and cease its military spending (Schmitt, 2021). While the motivations behind Putin's threat could only be speculated at the time, Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine confirms Putin's interest in undermining Ukrainian security and economic stability.
Russia also marketed Nord Stream 2 by stoking concerns and mistrust over Ukraine's viability as a gas transit country. During a 2009 dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices and transit fees, Russia accused Ukraine of stealing gas from its pipelines. On January 7, 2009, Russia cut off all gas transiting through Ukraine, putting Europe in a winter energy crisis (Reuters, 2009). Tens of thousands of homes were left without heat, and, within a week, 11 people froze to death (Harding & McLaughlin, 2009). The crisis put Europe on edge and seeded interest in alternative gas routes. While expressing concerns over the numerous ways the Nord Stream 2 deepened Russian gas dependence, the European Union still praised the pipeline's Ukrainian circumvention as an energy security asset (Martin, 2021). Russia successfully spun the project's distinct disadvantages for Ukraine as advantages for the rest of Europe. Many European countries were content to go along with this plan even at the known expense of Russia's neighbor. Only when war became real and Russia declared its intentions for Ukraine, did Germany and other Nord Stream 2 supporters pull out.
Nord Stream 2 highlights another Russian political tactic: elite capture. Russia systematically promises exclusive business deals, lucrative positions on the board of Russian-state companies, and financial backing to court foreign political and business elites. In exchange, these elites advocate Russian interests and cultivate a more favorable Russian opinion abroad. Elite capture happens at both high and low political visibility. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who initially broke the deal with Russia for the first Nord Stream pipeline, was appointed to the Nord Stream board of directors after his election loss in 2005 (Knight, 2021). Karin Kneissl, once Austria's foreign minister, became a board member of Russia's Rosneft Oil Company after her government tenure (Knight, 2021). With geopolitical interests at stake, human capital is an often overlooked resource vulnerable to Russian seizure.
Entrenched Technology
Europe's investment in Nord Stream 2 contradicts its long-term goals for fossil fuel reduction and a green energy transition. The EU's European Green Deal aims to both reduce 1990-level greenhouse gas emissions 55% by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2050. To this green-leaning Europe, Gazprom and Nord Stream marketed natural gas and Nord Stream 2 as a more environmentally conscious method of generating and transporting carbon-based energy. To shoehorn natural gas into the green energy movement, advocates leverage it against other carbon fuel sources like coal. Nord Stream representatives advertise that "using all the gas transported through Nord Stream 2 for power production instead of coal would save the CO2 emissions of 4 million average cars." Additionally, these representatives claim that the pipeline itself offers a cleaner way of transporting natural gas than existing methods because it avoids the carbon costs of liquefying and shipping the gas, and the pipeline itself runs 1,000 km shorter than those going through Ukraine. Europe has bought into these industry promises, classified natural gas as a green energy source, and hopes to use this brand of carbon fuel as it weans off coal and oil.
Natural gas and the infrastructure it requires, however, do not operate on short-term, "weaning" timescales. Nord Stream 2 is designed as long-term infrastructure intended to bind buyer and supplier together for decades. Gazprom has built its pipeline to last over 50 years, well beyond Europe's green energy deadline. This infrastructure lifespan is intentionally long, as the pipeline must operate for decades to recuperate its $11 billion-plus construction and maintenance costs. Lawsuits and fines like Poland's and Ukraine's, if successful, may serve only to lengthen the pipeline's operating life as Gazprom and Russia seek to recover financial losses. Nord Stream 2, if approved, could become a deeply entrenched technology, linking buyers and sellers politically, economically, and technically to a fossil fuel energy source for years to come.
Energy as a Vulnerable Infrastructure
On September 26, 2022, four coordinated explosions ruptured three of the four pipes comprising Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 (Sanderson et al., 2023). All pipes were filled with gas, and the explosions released more than 115,000 tons of natural gas over six days, an equivalent to one third of Denmark's annual CO2 emissions (Sanderson et al., 2023). In total, it was a complete ecological and economic disaster. The three damaged pipes were rendered inoperable and the gas escape became one of the worst man-made, single event methane releases in history (Dinneen, 2022). While no party has claimed responsibility for the attack, discovery of manmade explosive materials at the site has made human intervention unquestionable (Adomaitis & Ahlander, 2024).
Energy infrastructure projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are high visibility and high stakes targets with clear political, economic, and environmental impacts. Nord Stream 2 is already a project immersed in controversy, and its existence antagonizes the wellbeing of defined political entities like Ukraine. The political salience and societal role of large-scale energy infrastructure make it vulnerable to state sponsored or terrorist attacks. Disruptions to fuel sources can cause energy crises where millions are left without power, and the uncontrolled release of fuel can do significant damage to the surrounding environment. Even when dormant, energy infrastructure still stewards dangerous and toxic substances. Though Nord Stream 2 never became operational, its gas filled pipes unleashed the same environmental catastrophe as if it had. The explosions put local marine life at risk and severely threatened populations of harbour seals and harbour porpoises (Sanderson et al., 2023). A similar attack on land could damage terrestrial species and drive displacement of humans and wildlife.
Relevance to Advanced Nuclear Energy
We selected Nord Stream 2 as an example of an energy technology as a surrogate for geopolitical struggle. Nord Stream 2 exemplifies the power that countries can hold over one another through energy infrastructure and the ways in which technological deployment reflects geopolitical anxieties and strategies. Similarly to Nord Stream 2, advanced nuclear will be a technology that relies on the collaboration of host and receiving countries, making its deployment vulnerable to shifting geopolitical tensions. Moreover, Nord Stream 2 acted as a geopolitical bargaining chip, providing enormous economic and political leverage for Russia over Ukraine. Advanced nuclear could mirror these power dynamics by giving exporting countries undue influence over less powerful nations. Additionally, Nord Stream 2 was the target of explosions, wreaking ecological havoc and resulting in huge methane releases. Advanced nuclear is also vulnerable to terrorism, with similarly profound ecological and societal fallout.
Key Sources
Martin, R. (2021). The Nord Stream 2 pipeline. European Parliamentary Research Service.
Offshore Technology. (2024, March 8). Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Russia and Germany.
References
Adomaitis, N. & Ahlander, J. (2024, February 7). Nord Stream: What's known about the mystery pipeline explosions? Reuters.
Bureau of Energy Resources. (2021, April 9). Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. United States Department of State.
Dinneen, J. (2022). Nord Stream leak may have been largest methane emission ever recorded. New Scientist.
European Commission. (n.d.). The European Green Deal.
Harding, L. & McLaughlin, D. (2009, January 11). Deal to resume Russian gas eludes EU as 11 people die in big freeze-up. The Observer.
Harper, J. (2018, December 13). Nord Stream 2 pollution fears. DW.
Knight, B. (2021, July 23). The history of Nord Stream. DW.
Martin, R. (2021). The Nord Stream 2 pipeline. European Parliamentary Research Service.
Offshore Technology. (2024, March 8). Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Russia and Germany.
Petrequin, S. & Casert, R. (2022, July 6). E.U. lawmakers classify natural gas and nuclear as sustainable energy investments. PBS News.
Reuters. (2009, January 12). Gas crises between Russia and Ukraine.
Sanderson, H., Czub, M., Jakacki, J., Koschinski, S., Tougaard, J., Sveegaard, S., Frey, T., Fauser, P., Bełdowski, J., Beck, A. J., Przyborska, A., Olejnik, A., Szturomski, B. & Kicinski, R. (2023). Environmental impact of the explosion of the Nord Stream pipelines. Scientific Reports, 13(1), 19923.
Schmitt, B. (2021, June 14). Geopolitical weapon: Putin's pipeline nears completion. Atlantic Council.
Sytas, A. (2016, March 16). EU leaders sign letter objecting to Nord Stream-2 gas link. Reuters.
Photo: Two ships involved in construction of the natural gas pipeline North Stream 2: offshore support vessel Artemis Offshore and in background pipe layer Akademik Cherskiy, Mukran, September 2020. Pedant01 / CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
