Coca Codo Sinclair Dam

Author: Nora Lewis

Suggested Citation:

Lewis, N. (2026). Coca Codo Sinclair dam. Technology Assessment Project Case Study Library, University of Michigan. https://stpp.fordschool.umich.edu/tap-case-study-library/coca-codo-sinclair-dam

Coca Codo Sinclair Dam

Key Takeaways

• Governments and tech developers often treat large infrastructure projects as a panacea for complex social problems, fueled by political beliefs emphasizing innovation and technical supremacy. These projects often fail to include local and Indigenous input, and do not bring purported economic and development benefits as a result.
• World powers may use loans and technology and expertise transfers to harness geopolitical power, usually under the guise of mutual cooperation, respect, and benefits. Yet this dynamic often places less powerful countries in a position of diminished autonomy, and can lead to ineffective tech governance and economic dependency.
• "Green" energy projects may appear to be climate-forward, but when built under the above conditions, can produce other environmental harms that counteract decarbonization. Ineffective green energy projects may also reignite reliance on fossil fuels.

What is the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam?

The Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) Dam is a hydroelectric dam located in Ecuador's Napo Province, sitting on the Coca River in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The dam became fully operational in November of 2016, as part of broader efforts from the Ecuadorian government to address energy shortages that have impacted citizens for decades (Aguilera, 2023; Turkewitz & Cabrera, 2024). Alongside these hopes to bolster energy production and stability (initial estimates stated that the dam would deliver 20-30% of Ecuador's daily electricity production), the government also hoped to prove its technological and diplomatic capabilities by partnering with China to fund and build the historic project (Radomski, 2024).

It exists under the umbrella of Ecuador's "Buen Vivir" policy framework. In political spaces, the idea of "buen vivir" (or "good living," derived from Indigenous Andean concepts of life and community), is boiled down to policies and development emphasizing harmony with nature and those around us (Artaraz et al., 2021). When Ecuador rewrote its constitution in 2008, it became the first country in the world to recognize the rights of nature on a constitutional level (Lenhardt, 2023). Buen vivir appears 25 times in the constitution (though never formally defined), and has come to inform efforts for community-oriented, equitable, and sustainable development in Ecuador (Lenhardt, 2023). Yet ultimately, not all projects have done what they purport to, and many feel buen vivir's implementation has failed to address natural resource extraction and equity challenges sufficiently (Lenhardt, 2023; Williford, 2018). The Coca Codo Sinclair Dam, a grand build seeking to bring electricity to Ecuadorian communities and prove the country's commitment to innovative green energy production, is one of these problematic buen vivir projects.

The dam was designed and built by Sinohydro, China's state-owned construction company, and funded through a $1.7 billion loan from the Export Import Bank of China. Completed in 2016, the hydroelectric dam was inaugurated with a visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping. At the ceremony he stated, "China is willing to work with the Ecuadorian side in light of the principles of cooperation like equality, mutual benefit, win-win, flexibility, pragmatism, openness and inclusion to constantly deepen our cooperation" (Aguilera, 2023). Then-President Rafael Correa emphasized that this cooperation with China would bring energy, jobs, and a relationship with one of the world's most powerful countries. While in office, Correa sought to limit the influence of Western financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In particular, he maintained an increasingly hostile relationship with the United States, choosing to expel two U.S. officials in 2009 for treating Ecuador "like a colony," and later ordering the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to leave the country for similar concerns (Fieser, 2013; France 24, 2009). The Coca Codo Sinclair Dam was motivated by similar aims to build infrastructure without Western reliance, but has this relationship with China proven a "win-win" in practice?

Empty Promises of Energy Stability

Many would argue it hasn't. To begin with, promises of plentiful clean energy to address country-wide blackouts have not been fulfilled. The dam has never generated its total installed power capacity despite active operations since 2016, and blackouts remain a mainstay in Ecuador. In fall of 2024, for example, government-controlled blackouts rippled across the country, plunging 18 million into darkness for up to 14 hours per day (Noriega, 2024). These mandated power cuts aimed to curb the total collapse of Ecuador's electrical grid, which relies heavily on hydropower but has faced frequent droughts. As a result, Ecuador's manufacturing industry lost $4 billion and its commerce sector $3.5 billion during the first two months of blackouts (Noriega, 2024). Beyond economic setbacks, Ecuadorians have personally paid the price for these upheavals as small businesses and manufacturers struggle to keep their doors open, the sick are unable to use life-sustaining medical equipment at home, and children are forced to complete their homework in the dark (Noriega, 2024; Turkewitz & Cabrera, 2024). Power generators may be a viable lifeline for large businesses and wealthier households, but for many, they remain too expensive. Though government blackouts were halted at the beginning of 2025, they speak to an uncertain future for Ecuador's power sector.

Government officials have expressed a willingness to "temporarily" supplement insufficient hydropower production with fossil fuels (Alarcón, 2025). During recent blackouts, for example, the government issued a temporary exemption on all tariffs for petrol and diesel generators (Alarcón, 2025). Though meant as a quick fix for lofty generator prices, the measure came with immediate health impacts. One study found that the concentration of the pollutant nitrogen dioxide (NO2) increased by 22% in Quito during blackouts, surpassing the World Health Organisation's (WHO) permissible levels for 24-hour concentrations (Alarcón, 2025). Fine particulate matter PM2.5, which is linked to cancer and other cardiovascular diseases, also increased by 5.48% and exceeded WHO levels in this time. They found that the highest levels were recorded when blackouts lasted longer and there was a higher usage of fossil fuel generators (Alarcón, 2025). With the failure of much-hyped infrastructure like the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam to lift Ecuador out of its energy crisis, desperation threatens to backslide the country's clean energy goals and buen vivir philosophy.

Community Development and Employment

Another shortcoming of the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam is the minimal employment and local development benefits it has brought. Ecuadorian officials initially claimed that the dam would benefit local communities and workforces greatly, with promises that local people would receive 70% of dam-related jobs upon construction (Teräväinen, 2019; Vallejo et al., 2018). Because they lacked engineering expertise and were given no official training to bridge this gap, only about 40% of jobs were filled by local residents, and all were in temporary construction. Once the dam was complete, these temporary workers could not easily return to their previous forms of employment, effectively minimizing any long-term financial benefits of the dam (Vallejo et al., 2018). Regional unemployment increased as a result of this schema, and many families experienced financial instability. Sinohydro imported most of its high-expertise jobs from China, but of the smaller number of Ecuadorian engineers hired, most came from urban areas of the country (Casey & Krauss, 2018; Vallejo et al., 2018). But these workers struggled to operate equipment because of communication issues such as equipment labels incorrectly translated from Chinese to Spanish (Casey & Krauss, 2018).

Beyond direct employment, developers and government officials emphasized that local businesses would increase their profits by selling food, housing, and other goods both on and off construction sites (Vallejo et al., 2018). But for local businesses to provide these on-site services, they needed to formally partner with Sinohydro and meet onerous bureaucratic requirements, including registration with tax and public procurement offices (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2022; Vallejo et al., 2018). This proved an obstacle to many businesses, especially smaller ones, further diluting the development promises of the dam. And although some nearby property owners benefited from short-term increases in rental and business revenues during dam construction, alcohol use, street fights, and theft increased in tandem (Vallejo et al., 2018). Sinohydro even promised to make direct investments in local infrastructure such as schools, health centers, and sewage systems, but many of these projects were never realized by the company. Those that were often did not account for long-term operational challenges, with few permanent budgets created to finance services such as internet or create permanent staff for schools (Vallejo et al., 2018).

Despite its framing as a locally beneficial project (an angle which helped garner greater local enthusiasm), the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam once again fell short in achieving these outcomes. Not only did it fail to invigorate local economies and employment meaningfully, but it also failed to secure stable energy access for those nearby, another broader promise of the project. Neighboring communities, particularly rural areas around and in the Ecuadorian Amazon, still do not have reliable or affordable energy access (Casey & Krauss, 2018).

Structural Flaws, Environmental Impacts, and Indigenous Traditions

Decades before the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam was built, engineers warned that its location in a natural disaster-prone valley could threaten the safety of workers and local communities, as well as the health of the Ecuadorian Amazon (Casey & Krauss, 2018). During this time, the potential dam project was shelved because of flaws identified in a 1992 feasibility study, and failed to garner interest from international funding agencies and other countries (Varas & Paz y Miño, 2023). But with Rafael Correa taking office by 2007, his administration sparked renewed interest in the project, throwing their weight behind a flawed project to prove Ecuador's innovative technical capabilities and climate-forward thinking. Scholars and environmental experts have stated that supposedly "new" feasibility studies conducted at this time merely pulled antiquated data used in the 1992 study (Varas & Paz y Miño, 2023). In the wake of climate change and widespread droughts, Ecuador's rivers look very different than they did in 1992, making these environmental assessments inaccurate and insufficient judges of the dam's impacts.

When construction began on the dam in 2010, all these anticipated safety concerns came to life. Crews observed faulty steel equipment provided by Sinohydro, and in 2014, a pressure well collapsed and killed 13 workers (Casey & Krauss, 2018). In response, workers went on strike to protest noncompliance with labor rights regulations, including health, safety, and wage protections (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2022; Lozano, 2019). Sinohydro threatened to fire or even press charges against these protestors, and some said they were transferred to other hydroelectric plants as punishment, performing tasks that they had little to no expertise in (Varas & Paz y Miño, 2023). This speaks to not only the retaliatory nature of dam management, but the unsafe situations they placed both workers and surrounding communities in by sending workers to jobs they were not qualified for.

The turnkey nature of the project, with all major decisions on design and construction left to the discretion of Ecuador's Chinese partners, also allowed dangerous equipment and working conditions to be swept under the rug. Even when the plant was completed, workers reported over 7,600 cracks in the dam's infrastructure which threatened the safety of operations (Casey & Krauss, 2018). Between January and June of 2024, the dam closed 18 times due to problems with sediment accumulation, a chronic problem plaguing the dam since the very beginning (Alarcón, 2025). Now, the environmental impacts of the dam have come into question. The flow of the Coca River, which the dam is situated on, has changed in recent years, impacting fish migration and giving way to erosion and increased sedimentation around the dam (Velastegui-Montoya et al., 2024). The nearby San Rafael Waterfall, a major tourist attraction and once Ecuador's tallest waterfall, collapsed due to erosion in 2020, with many believing the dam's disruption to the local ecosystem accelerated its collapse.

Local Indigenous communities living in Ecuador's Amazon have cited fish shortages and disruption to their traditional fishing practices, which beyond cultural importance also help sustain these communities (Palma, 2017). The dam must release the water held in its reservoirs nightly, which some scientists believe has altered the river's chemistry and impacted fish behavior. The sediment retention in these reservoirs has also deprived fish populations of sufficient nutrients, leaving smaller and less sustaining species for Indigenous communities to consume (Palma, 2017). The claim from developers that this project would not only increase energy access, but also foster economic development in local communities stands in stark opposition to the reality: unchanged (or even worsened) incomes, job opportunities, energy access, and quality of life for the region.

A New Kind of Foreign Investment Reliance?

In framing the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam as a departure from past intrusions of American dollars and political overreach, Ecuador ceded considerable power to another source of intrusion: China. This partnership allowed China to shape construction, labor, and operational processes almost entirely, giving local workforces and communities minimal-to-no-say in the project and its impacts. Despite the tenets of "equality" and "win-win" cooperation, Ecuador is instead saddled with risky and underperforming infrastructure, expedited erosion, and an uncertain energy future. It is also now indebted to China for funding the massive project, making many of its payments through crude oil deliveries to China instead of traditional currency (Casey & Krauss, 2018). In essence, to maintain projects such as Coca Codo, Ecuador must maintain its own extractive fossil fuel industry. This forces local communities and ecosystems, particularly in the Amazon, to endure the burden of degradation, pollution, and health harms stemming from large, ineffective energy initiatives (Coronel Vargas et al., 2020).

Is Ecuador any better off for its burgeoning reliance on Chinese loans? It doesn't appear so. On autonomy, energy stability, and economic development fronts, the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam failed to deliver. The broader political rhetoric surrounding its development fostered technological lock-in, meaning that Ecuador will be stuck with this technology for many years, and is unlikely to reap purported benefits. This came at the cost of investments in a diversified portfolio of energy technology such as wind and solar, which is particularly problematic for a hydropower-reliant state like Ecuador, that will only experience more intense droughts in the face of climate change. The salient political ideal of technology as a saving grace for a multitude of nuanced political, social, environmental, and economic problems has yet again proven flawed with the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam.

Relevance to Advanced Nuclear Energy

The Coca Codo Sinclair Dam case speaks to the challenges nations may face when importing technologies from wealthy, technically robust nations, particularly if this exchange leaves the importing nation with less autonomy and unintended impacts. Advanced reactors are already (and are likely to be more so in the future) a bargaining chip for geopolitical power struggles, and thus are vulnerable to similar problems as the Coca Codo case. Further, the dam case shows how projects that do not seek local and Indigenous input in governance or design often create harms that can threaten tradition and community access to local life-sustaining resources.

Key Sources

Casey, N., & Krauss, C. (2018, December 24). It doesn't matter if Ecuador can afford this dam. China still gets paid. The New York Times.

Jimenez, R., & Panchana, A. (2021, December 16). El polémico y costoso proyecto de infraestructura que replantea la energía en Ecuador. Dialogue Earth.

Varas, E., & Paz y Miño, E. (2023, April 20). Todas las fisuras de Coca Codo Sinclair. GK.

Palma, J. (2017, June 1). Ecuador: Comunidad Amazónica denuncia escasez de peces y culpa a la mayor hidroeléctrica construida en el país. Mongabay.

Radomski, J. (2024, August 21). The ongoing saga of a Chinese infrastructure project in Ecuador. AULA Blog.

Teräväinen, T. (2019). Negotiating water and technology: Competing expectations and confronting knowledges in the case of the Coca Codo Sinclair in Ecuador. Water, 11(3).

Turkewitz, J., & Cabrera, J. M. L. (2024, December 30). The rivers run dry and the lights go out: A warming nation's doom loop. The New York Times.

Vásconez Davidsson, S. (2021, July 26). La erosión del Río Coca, La Coca Codo Sinclair y el futuro energético del país. La Fuente.

References

Aguilera, N. (2023, February 28). Controversy in Ecuador's largest China-built infrastructure project. Voice of America.

Alarcón, I. (2025, April 8). As elections loom, Ecuador's energy crisis still seems short on solutions. Dialogue Earth.

Artaraz, K., Calestani, M., & Trueba, M. L. (2021). Introduction: Vivir bien/buen vivir and post-neoliberal development paths in Latin America: Scope, strategies, and the realities of implementation. Latin American Perspectives, 48(3), 4-16.

BBC. (2014, April 25). Pentagon staff "to leave Ecuador" after Correa order.

Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. (n.d.). Ecuador: Comunidades indígenas denuncian que, además de falta de remediación por derrames petroleros, la industria erosiona la cuenca del río Coca. Retrieved January 16, 2025.

Casey, N., & Krauss, C. (2018, December 24). It doesn't matter if Ecuador can afford this dam. China still gets paid. The New York Times.

Coronel Vargas, G., Au, W. W., & Izzotti, A. (2020). Public health issues from crude-oil production in the Ecuadorian Amazon territories. Science of The Total Environment, 719.

Fieser, E. (n.d.). At odds with Ecuador, USAID moves to leave. Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved April 18, 2025.

France 24. (2009, February 8). President Correa expels US official.

Jimenez, R., & Panchana, A. (2021, December 16). El polémico y costoso proyecto de infraestructura que replantea la energía en Ecuador. Dialogue Earth.

Lenhardt, A. (2023, June 6). Ecuador's 2008 constitution integrates Indigenous values on equality, diversity, reciprocity, and sustainability. Pathfinders.

Noriega, C. (2024, December 19). In the dark: How rolling blackouts have transformed life in Ecuador. Al Jazeera.

Palma, J. (2017, June 1). Ecuador: Comunidad Amazónica denuncia escasez de peces y culpa a la mayor hidroeléctrica construida en el país. Mongabay.

Radomski, J. (2024a, April 10). China, Ecuador and the Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric Power Plant. Latinoamérica 21.

Radomski, J. (2024b, August 21). The ongoing saga of a Chinese infrastructure project in Ecuador. AULA Blog.

Teräväinen, T. (2019). Negotiating water and technology: Competing expectations and confronting knowledges in the case of the Coca Codo Sinclair in Ecuador. Water, 11(3).

Turkewitz, J., & Cabrera, J. M. L. (2024, December 30). The rivers run dry and the lights go out: A warming nation's doom loop. The New York Times.

Vallejo, M. C., Espinosa, B., Venes, F., López, V., & Anda, S. (2018). Evading sustainable development standards: Case studies on hydroelectric projects in Ecuador. Global Development Policy Center.

Varas, E., & Paz y Miño, E. (2023, April 20). Todas las fisuras de Coca Codo Sinclair. GK.

Vásconez Davidsson, S. (2021, July 26). La erosión del Río Coca, La Coca Codo Sinclair y el futuro energético del país. La Fuente.

Velastegui-Montoya, A., García-Romero, J. A., Chuizaca-Espinoza, I. A., Quevedo, R. P., Santana-Cunha, C., Ochoa-Brito, J. I., & Arias-Hidalgo, M. (2024). Assessing regressive erosion effects: Unveiling riverside land use land cover changes post hydroelectric project construction. Environmental Challenges, 15.

Williford, B. (2018). Buen vivir as policy: Challenging neoliberalism or consolidating state power in Ecuador. Journal of World-Systems Research, 24(1).

Photo: Central Hidroeléctrica Coca Codo Sinclair durante su construcción, circa 2016. amalavida.tv / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons